The Regulator for Charities in England and Wales

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

CHARITY INCOME RESERVES

PRECEDENTS - TRUSTEES' DUTY TO APPLY INCOMING RESOURCES

OG 43 P1 – 15 May 2009

Purpose  

Functional responsibility

For action For information Charity Services

Contents

1. A-G v Alford
2. Private discretionary trusts
3. The corporate property of a charitable company

Index to further related information

  None of the precedent cases set out in this OG relate to a particular charitable institution as such. However, precedents 1 and 2 illustrate the trust law principle that the incoming resources of a trust should be applied within a reasonable time of receipt. Although there is no directly similar case involving a company, precedent 3 illustrates the analogous principle that the incoming resources of a company should be used to further its objects.

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1. A-G v Alford

  In the case of A-G v Alford (1854) 4 De G,M & G 843 there was a gift of capital to a trustee on trust to apply the income for relief in need purposes. The trustee was clearly considered to be in breach of trust for failing for 13 years actually to apply any income of the trust for those purposes, and the case clearly supports the proposition that charity trustees ought to apply the income of the trust for the purposes of the charity within a reasonable period of receipt.

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2. Private discretionary trusts

  More modern precedents exist in cases relating to private discretionary trusts. The duties of the trustees of such a trust are, in this context, essentially the same as those of the trustees of a charitable trust. The trustees have a duty to apply the trust income for the benefit of a class of individuals, or a class consisting of individuals and charities or other institutions, in such proportions as they decide.
  In re Locker's Will Trusts (1977) 1 WLR 1323, the trustees were required to distribute the income of a discretionary trust between a number of individuals and charitable and other institutions. The trustees were slow to do so. Goulding J said:
  ‘It is common ground that it was the duty of the trustees to distribute the trust income within a reasonable time after it came into their hands …. In the case of a compelling trust to distribute income the failure to execute the trust promptly is an unfulfilled duty still in existence.’
  The judge referred to an earlier case, Re Gourju's Will Trusts (1943) Ch 24 in which Simonds J had said in relation to the discretionary trusts in s.33(1)(ii) of the Trustee Act 1925:
  ‘A further question is raised upon this summons, which involves the construction of the Trustee Act 1925, s.33(1)(ii), that is whether, the discretionary trust having arisen, under the terms of that section the trustees may retain all or any part of the income, if they think proper, and postpone the application thereof for so long as they think fit; or, alternatively, whether they are bound to expend in each year the income of that year for the purposes indicated in the subsection. The language of the subsection appears to be clear. The obligation is to apply the income:
  ‘…. for the maintenance or support or otherwise for the benefit of …’
  all or any persons indicated. Following the decision of Eve J, in Re Peel, I think I must come to the conclusion that the obligation of the trustees is to apply the trust income as and when they receive it for the purposes indicated in the subsection, with, of course, such necessary limitations upon absolute obligation as the practical necessities of the case demand. Putting it in a negative way, they are not entitled, regardless of the needs of the beneficiaries, to retain in their hands the income of the trust estate.’
  It is clear from the words in italics that the understanding of the nature of the duty to apply the income of a trust promptly takes account of the fact that income may need to be retained in order that the trustees can properly discharge the purposes of the trust.
  There was more explicit focus on this issue in the case of Re Berkley (1968)Ch 744. In this case the rights of a beneficiary to receive trust income were held to have been properly postponed by the trustees. They needed to retain that income in order to guard against the risk that an annuity, which was charged on the trust income, might, in the future, need to be paid partly out of retained income if current year trust income was not sufficient.
  The process was not considered to be an accumulation of income (that is the conversion of income into capital) - had it been it would have been prevented by statute. It simply involved the exercise of an implied power of the trustees to retain income where that was considered necessary in order to be able properly to carry out the objects of the trust.

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3. The corporate property of a charitable company

  Legislation exists to enable a company to be compulsorily wound up on just and equitable grounds.
  In re A Company No 370 of 1987 (1998) 1 WLR 1068, it was recognised that the members of a trading company had a legitimate expectation that the profits of a trading company would be distributed by way of dividend, except to the extent that a business case existed for the retention of the dividends in the company.
  The parallel legitimate expectation in the case of a charitable company would be that its incoming resources would actually be used to further its objects.

Index to further related information

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